I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are composed of a number of sensors (tens or thousands) that are deployed to collect data in a target area [1] , [2] . WSN has been recently applied in various fields, including environmenttal monitoring, healthcare, agriculture, manufacturing, military sensing and tracking, and disaster alert [1] - [5] . The design of specific WSNs is dependent on the given application and the environment under which it operates [1] . In addition, different from traditional wireless net works, sensors in WSNs operate with resource constraints such as limited power, low computing and communication ability and small storage capability [1] - [3] , [6] - [8] . In WSNs, user queries are generally transmitted to and received from the GW (gateway node). However, in some special applications, user needs to obtain real-time data directly from sensors [1] , [3] , [8] , [9] .
In recent years, several two-factor user authentication schemes in WSNs have been proposed. In 2006, Wong et al. [10] proposed a dynamic user authentication scheme using only one-way hash functions for computation efficiency on sensor nodes. However, Das [3] in 2009 pointed out that Wong et al.'s scheme cannot prevent some attacks such as many logged-in users with the same login-id threats and stolen-verifier attacks. Das [3] proposed a two-factor user authentication in WSNs using a smart card and a password instead of maintaining a password/verifier table. In the subsequent years, several researchers, however, pointed out that Das's scheme still has certain security flaws. In 2010, Chen and Shih [11] pointed out that Das's scheme does not provide mutual authentication, and proposed a mutual authentication scheme between the user, the gateway, and the sensor nodes. In the same year, He et al. [9] insisted that Das's scheme has security weaknesses against insider attacks and impersonation attacks. Khan and Alghathbar [4] pointed out that Das's scheme is vulnerable to gateway node bypassing attacks and privileged-insider attacks. In 2012, Vaidya et al. [12] pointed out that the schemes proposed by Das [3] , Kan and Alghathbar [4] and Chen and Shih [11] are all insecure against stolen smart card attacks and sensor node impersonation attacks with node capture attacks, and do not provide key agreement. In [12] , Vaidya et al. proposed a novel two-factor mutual authentication with key agreement scheme to prevent these attacks. In 2014, Kim Jiye et al. [13] [13] : a user, a gateway node, and a sensor node. The scheme is composed of four phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication-key agreement phase, and password change phase. We describe each phase in detail from section A to section D. The notations used in the remainder of this paper are shown in Table I.   TABLE I The maximum of transmission delay time permitted ID H PW to GW in secure channels. R-3: GW computes the following when it receives the registration request from i U . 
A. Registration Phase
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C. Authentication-Key Agreement Phase
The authentication-key agreement phase begins when GW receives an authentication request from i U . In this phase, i U , the GW and j S send and receive authentication request from one another. The following describes the process in detail.
A-1: 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF KIM JIYE ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we analyze the security of Kim Jiye et al.'s scheme. In the following sections, we describe possible attacks in detail. We assume that an attacker can eavesdrop on or intercept all message sent or received between communication parties. We also assume that an attack can read data stored in a smart card in any manner such as found in the related works [2] , [3] , [14] - [17] . In addition, we have to note that data stored in sensor nodes are not secure since attackers can capture sensor nodes that are deployed in unattended environments and then can extract data from them.
A. Offline Password Guessing Attack
Since K can also be derived. The detailed process is shown as follows.
Step 1: The attacker
Ussmart card in any manner which is used in the related works [2] , [3] , [14] - [17] .
Step 2: U a chooses a random nonce _ Step 5: The Step 10: The smart card computes 
